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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Petitioner,

Case No. 20010809-SC

v.
ANTHONY JAMES WANOSIK,
Defendant-Respondent.
REPLY BRIEF
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant asserts that "[t]he judge in this case was the only Third District Court
judge who routinely sentenced defendants in absentia when they did not appear at
sentencing." Br. Respondent at 2 n.l; see id. at 19-20. This allegation is based on
speculation and is without support in the record or in publicly available documents.
Defense counsel points to a number of cases where this judge sentenced defendants in
absentia. Nothing in the record, however, indicates whether this judge routinely
sentenced defendants in absentia or whether he sometimes sentenced defendants in
absentia, but sometimes did not. Nothing suggests with what regularity other judges
sentenced defendants in absentia. All that is known—information from court decisions
that have been made public—is that this judge sentenced several defendants in absentia
and they appealed.

ARGUMENT
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT LA.
A DEFENDANT ABSENT WITHOUT EXPLANATION AFTER
RECEIVING NOTICE OF HIS HEARING MAY BE PRESUMED
VOLUNTARILY ABSENT
A.

Utah precedent supports a presumption of voluntariness. The court of appeals
erred in holding that an unexplained absence must be presumed involuntary.
Defendant argues that "the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the trial

court erred in presuming that [defendant's] absence was voluntary/' Br. Respondent at 9.
Defendant argues that the court's "decision is based on precedent." Id.
Defendant relies primarily on State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677 (Utah 1986), a trial-inabsentia case, where the appellate court held that a defendant's absence was not
voluntary. Like defendant, Houtz failed to appear. In Houtz's case, however, unlike
defendant's, a reason for Houtz's absence was presented to the trial court. When Houtz
did not appear, the prosecutor, who had learned that Houtz had been arrested in
California, conveyed this information to the trial court. Id. at 678. The trial court,
nevertheless, determined that Houtz's absence was voluntary because Houtz "had left
Utah in violation of his bail." Id. at 678. This Court reversed, holding that "a defendant
in custody... is not free to make a voluntary decision about whether or not he will attend
court proceedings.'* Id.
Houtz is therefore inapposite. The issue here is whether a court may presume that
a defendant, who is absent without explanation after receiving notice of his sentencing

2

hearing, may be presumed voluntarily absent. Houtz's absence was not without
explanation. Where voluntariness "is determined by considering the totality of the
circumstances," the totality in Houtz's case included an explanation for his absence, i.e.,
incarceration. No similar circumstance is present here.
Defendant's also attempts to distinguish three Utah cases cited in the State's
opening brief—State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1996), State v. Myers, 508 P.2d
41 (Utah 1973), and State v. Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 987 (Utah App. 1989). Each case,
however, involved a defendant who had actual or constructive notice of a proceeding but
neither appeared nor proffered any explanation at the time of the proceeding or thereafter.
In each of these cases, the appellate court affirmed a trial court's finding that the
defendant had voluntarily absented himself. Defendant has not adequately distinguished
any of them.
B.

Wanosik effectively mandates that the State make extensive investigational
inquiries whenever a defendant fails to appear.
Defendant argues that "Wanosik does not mandate" that the State contact law

enforcement agencies, local hospitals, the defendant's employer, pretrial services, and
bail bond companies and attempt to contact an absent defendant at his residence or other
places he is known to frequent. Br. Respondent at 16. Rather, defendant argues, Wanosik
merely "provides [a] list of practical suggestions to prosecutors who hope to proceed with
a sentencing in absentia when a defendant does not appear." Id.

3

True, the Wanosik decision does not "definitively prescribe what the State must do
to meet its preliminary burden [to establish voluntariness]," but its suggested "avenues for
establishing voluntariness" leave prosecutors with little choice but to follow each and
every suggested route. State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 41, f 23,31 P.3d 615. Unless the
State has investigated all suggested "avenues," it cannot ascertain that it has met the
"preliminary burden" that Wanosik requires. The list is thus more than a series of
practical suggestions. It is the benchmark against which the State's efforts will be judged.
Future defendants will undoubtedly point to every possibility on the list not pursued by
the prosecution.
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT LB.
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT HE DID NOT KNOWINGLY
WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO PRESENCE IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE
THIS COURT
A.

This issue was not raised in the State's certiorari petition and is not fairly
included therein.
Defendant argues that his absence was not knowing. Br. Respondent at 21-26.

Defendant argues that "[i]n order to knowingly waive therightto presence, the record
must establish not only that [he] knew the date of his sentencing hearing, but also that he
knew the sentencing would proceed even if he were not present." Id. at 22. In other
words, defendant argues that the trial court should have warned him that sentencing
would proceed in his absence. See id.

4

The court of appeals rejected defendant's argument below. Wanosik, 2001 UT
App 241, Y| 11-16. The court of appeals concluded, "We see no error in the trial court's
failure to specifically warn [defendant] that sentencing would proceed in the event of his
voluntary absencefromthe proceeding." Id. at f 16. The Defendant filed no petition or
cross-petition for certiorari review. This issue was not raised in the State's petition and is
not fairly included therein. See Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4); see also Coulter & Smith, Ltd.
v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998) (review limited to issues raised in petitions or
fairly included therein). Thus, defendant's claim is not properly before this Court.
B.

No Utah precedent requires that a defendant be warned that he will be
sentenced if he fails to appear.
In any event, the claim lacks merit. Defendant cites no Utah precedent for his

claim; and the State has discovered none. Utah's sentencing-in-absentia rule states: "On
the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may
likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(b). The
trial-in-absentia rule states: "The defendant's voluntary absencefromthe trial after
notice to defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the casefrombeing tried and a
verdict or judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been
present;

" Utah R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2) (emphasis added). Therefore, sentencing may

proceed where a defendant has been given notice of the sentencing proceeding, but
voluntarily absents himself. The rule requires no warning. Further, defendant has cited

5

no Utah trial-in-absentia or sentencing-in-absentia case that requires a warning, and the
State has located none.
Further, the United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant's knowing and
voluntary absence waives his right to presence, even where the defendant has received no
warning that proceedings will continue in his absence. See Taylor v. United, 414 U.S. 17,
20 (1973) (a trial-in-absentia case (a) holding that in-absentia proceeding deprived
voluntarily absent defendant of no constitutional right and (b) expressly rejecting the
warning requirement imposed by United States v. McPherson, All F.2d 1127,1130 (D.C.
Cir. 1969), a sentencing-in-absentia case).
Defendant here had notice. His absence was therefore knowing, even though the
court did not expressly warn him that sentencing could proceed in his absence.
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT I.C.
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD
HAVE WEIGHED THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN PROCEEDING
AGAINST DEFENDANT'S INTEREST IN BEING PRESENT IS NOT
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT
A.

This issue was not raised in the State's certiorari petition and is not fairly
included therein.
Defendant argues that this Court should exercise "its supervisory power to require

trial courts to weigh the public interest in proceeding against the defendant's interest in
being present before allowing a defendant to be sentenced in absentia" Br. Respondent
at 27. Defendant thereby asks this Court to address a claim rejected by the court of
appeals and not raised in the State's petition for certiorari review. See Wanosik, 2001 UT
6

App 241, ^J 17-18. Further, this claim is not fairly included in any issue raised in the
State's petition and is therefore not properly before this Court.
B.

No Utah precedent requires that the trial courts weigh the public interest in
proceeding against the defendant's interest in being present before allowing a
defendant to be sentenced in absentia.
In any event, this claim also lacks merit. Defendant points to no Utah law

requiring the trial court to balance the public interest in proceeding against the
defendant's interest in being present before sentencing a voluntarily absent defendant in
absentia. The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure governing in-absentia proceedings, rules
17(a)(2) and 22(b), do not require a balancing. Neither do any of the Utah cases
addressing in-absentia proceedings.
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT I.D.
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT THE SENTENCING IN
ABSENTIA WAS HARMFUL IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS
COURT
A.

This issue was not raised in the State's certiorari petition and is not fairly
included therein.
Defendant argues that the court of appeals "employed an incorrect analysis in

assessing harm." Br. Respondent at 30 n.7. In other words, defendant argues that the
court of appeals properly determined that his absence was involuntary, but improperly
determined that sentencing him in absentia was harmless. The court of appeals decided
the harm issue against defendant. See Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, f 26. The State did
not raise this issue in its petition for certiorari review. Neither is this issue fairly included
7

within any issue raised by the State, including the issue of voluntariness. This issue is
therefore not properly before this Court.
B.

Any error in conducting sentencing without further inquiry into the reasons
for defendant's absence was harmless.
Conducting sentencing without further inquiry into the reasons for defendant's

absence was, if error, harmless. The question here is whether defendant was deprived of
his right to be present at sentencing. Defendant was only deprived of that right if his
absence was, in fact, involuntary. Defendant, however, offered record testimony that his
absence was voluntary. After he was finally apprehended, he wrote a letter to the trial
judge acknowledging, "I do not have a legitimate excuse" for not appearing for
sentencing. R. 66 (emphasis in original). Because defendant was voluntarily absent, the
trial court deprived defendant of norightby proceeding to sentencing.
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT II.B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY REVIEWED THE
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF UTAH RULE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 22(a) PURSUANT TO RULE 22(e)
A.

This issue is fairly included in the State's challenge to the court of appeals9
decision that the trial court had violated rule 22(a).
In its petition for certiorari review, the State challenged the court of appeals'

decision that the trial court had violated rule 22(a). The State argued below that
defendant had not preserved this issue and had not demonstrated plain error. To reach
this issue, the court of appeals held that a violation of rule 22(a) would constitute an
illegal sentence under rule 22(e). See Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, f 28 n.l 1. This issue
8

is therefore fairly included in the State's challenge to the court of appeals' disposition of
the rule 22(a) issue.
B.

Defendant's sentence was neither "illegal" nor "imposed in an illegal
manner."
The court of appeals held that the trial court violated rule 22(a) by imposing

sentence without affirmatively soliciting inputfromdefense counsel and the prosecutor.
Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, f 32. In its opening brief, the State argued that this kind of
error, assuming error occurred, does not make a sentence illegal. Br. Petitioner at 20-27.
Defendant countered by arguing that this sentence, even if not illegal, was a sentence
"imposed in an illegal manner" under rule 22(e).1 Br. Respondent at 38.
Defendant thus argues that a sentence is illegally imposed where the sentencing
proceeding violates the procedural requirements of rule 22(a). Specifically, if the trial
court imposes sentence without inviting defense counsel and the prosecutor to offer
mitigating information, defendant argues, that sentence is illegally imposed. The logical
extension of defendant's argument is that any procedural error at sentencing would cause
the sentence to be one "imposed in an illegal manner," correctable at any time. Such a
reading would effectively eviscerate preservation requirements at sentencing.

defendant also argues that the State has misread State v. Wareham, 801 P.2d 918
(Utah 1990). Br. Respondent at 41. The State agrees that it has misread Wareham and that
Wareham involved an attack on a conviction and was, for that reason, not subject to rule
22(e) analysis. The State therefore concedes that Wareham is not dispositive on this issue.
The State does not, however, concede that rule 22(a) error is correctable at any time under
rule 22(e).

9

This Court has not definitively addressed the difference, if any, between "an illegal
sentence" and "a sentence imposed in an illegal manner." This Court had held, however,
that the purpose of rule 22(e) is to allow correction of "manifestly illegal sentences."
State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, If 5,48 P.3d 228. Further, this Court has held that "rule
22(e) claims are not restricted by time limits for bringing a notice of appeal." Id. "Nor
are they waived by failure to raise them at the first opportunity before the district court."
Id. "For this reason, rule 22(e) claims must be narrowly circumscribed to prevent abuse."
Id.
As argued in the State's brief of petitioner, an illegal sentence is a sentence that
does not conform to the crime. Br. Petitioner at 21-22. In other words, rule 22(e)
bestows continuing jurisdiction to correct a sentence that is more harsh or more lenient
than that statutorily specified for the convicted offense. State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86, 87
(Utah 1991). It does not create continuing jurisdiction to address all error that may arise
out of a sentencing proceeding. See, e.g., State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041,1043 n.2 (Utah
App. 1994) (rule 22(e) did not create jurisdiction to amend a sentence after Parker's
conviction was overturned because the sentence was legal when imposed).
Given the narrow construction this Court has given to "illegal sentence," a
sentence "imposed in an illegal manner" cannot mean, as defendant assumes, continuing
jurisdiction to address any procedural error at sentencing. A construction that broad
would swallow up the limitation in the Court's cases defining "illegal sentence."
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Rather, rule 22(e) "allowfs] correction of manifestly illegal sentences." Telford,
2002 UT 51, f 5. Likewise, rule 22(e) allows correction of sentences imposed in a
manifestly illegal manner. A court does not impose sentence in a manifestly illegal
manner, however, just because a procedural error occurs during the sentencing
proceeding.2
In this case, had defendant been present and had he asked to address the court,
denial of his rule 22(a) allocution right would have been error. See State v. Young, 853
P.2d 327, 370 (Durham, J.), 417 (Zimmerman, J.), 418 (Stewart, J.) (Utah 1993)
(defendant has statutory right to make a statement prior to sentencing). Whether that
error would have made his sentence one "imposed in an illegal manner" is not clear. No
Utah precedent suggests that it would. But, even assuming that to impose sentence while

2

The State could find no case from this Court specifically defining what rule 22(e)
means by a sentence "imposed in an illegal manner." The State therefore does not attempt
to propose an exhaustive list of circumstances in which a sentence may be imposed "in an
illegal manner." It is clear, however, that the circumstances in which a sentence could be so
characterized are few. It could be argued, for example, that a sentence that conforms to the
crime, but is imposed by a court without jurisdiction, is a sentence imposed in a manifestly
illegal manner. Cf. State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, J 5 n.l ("rule 22(e) may be employed to
correct a sentence under circumstances where the sentencing court had no jurisdiction, or to
correct a sentence beyond the authorized statutory range").
Further, while the terminology "imposed in an illegal manner" is used in the rules and
statutes of other jurisdictions, precedent from those jurisdictions should be viewed with
caution. In most jurisdictions, sentences imposed in an illegal manner are reviewable only
within a limited period after the sentence is imposed. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 6-90-111
(West 2001) (ninety days); S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-31-1 (West 2002) (one year). Where
illegally imposed sentences are correctable at any time, as they are in Utah, categorizing a
sentence as illegally imposed implicates different policy considerations.

11

denying a defendant his statutory right to allocution is to impose sentence in a manifestly
illegal manner, the error here is twice removed. First, no request was made. This case
does not involve the denial of a request or the refusal to hearfromany party. Second,
defendant was not present and, by his absence, had waived his right to allocution. See
State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1110 ("The right to allocution is nowhere specifically
granted in either the state or the federal constitution. It is an inseparable part of the right
to be present, which defendant waived by his voluntary absence."). To impose sentence
without affirmatively soliciting inputfromdefense counsel is not to impose sentence in a
manifestly illegal manner. The court of appeals therefore erred in holding that rule 22(e)
"obviate[d] the need for [defendant] to show plain error in asserting" his rule 22(a)
claim.3 See Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, % 28 n.ll; cf. State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10,

3

The court of appeals' broad reading of the reach of rule 22(e) is consistent with that
court's trend, evidenced by a number of its decisions over the past decade, to extend the
reach of rule 22(e). In extending the ambit of rule 22(e), however, the court has failed to
examine the ramifications of a broad reading of the rule:
In State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676 (Utah App.1991), the court of appeals
implicitly held that a trial court's failure to order that a defendant be mentally
examined prior to sentencing could constitute rule 22(e) error.
In State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041 (Utah App. 1994), the court held that the
defendant's claim that he had been improperly denied the return of fees did not
constitute a rule 22(e) error. Unfortunately, in defining an "illegal sentence,"
the court cited habeas corpus cases addressing Shondel, equal protection, and
due process challenges.
In State v. Finlayson, 957 P.2d 282 (Utah App. 1998), the court erroneously
held that rule 22(e) permitted review of the defendant's merger claim. See
State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, f 8,994 P.2d 1243.
In State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, 975 P.2d 476, the court properly
reviewed defendant's preserved claim that his sentencing violated double
12

f 8, 994 P.2d 1243 (holding that^ourt of appeals decision to review a merger claim under
rule 22(e) was error).
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT II.C.l.
KELBACH HAS NOT BEEN OVERRULED NOR IS ITS RULING
UNDERMINED BY DEFENDANT'S CITED CASES
In its opening brief, the State argued that this Court has held that "[t]he failure of
the trial court to ask a defendant, represented by an attorney, whether he has anything to
say before sentence is imposed (allocution), does not in itself constitute constitutional
error." Brief Petitioner at 16, 28 (quoting State v. Kelbach, 461 P.2d 297, 299 (Utah

•

jeopardy. The court suggested in dicta, however, that absent preservation the
issue would be reviewable pursuant to rule 22(e). Id. at f 6 n. 1.
In State v. Burr, 2000 UT App 288 (unpublished opinion) (attached in
Addendum B), the court addressed the defendant's rule 22 claim that his
"sentence was imposed in an illegal manner because he was not personally
provided with a copy of the presentence report/' Id. at f 2. While the court
rejected the claim on the merits, it did not question the propriety of the rule
22(e) route to review.

In State v. Headley, 2002 UT App 58 (unpublished opinion) (attached in Addendum
B), the court of appeals attempted to distinguish between illegal sentences and sentences
imposed in an illegal manner. In so doing, the court cited foreign authority suggesting that
sentences imposed in an illegal manner are "those that are within statutory and jurisdictional
limits, but violate a defendant's rights." Id. at f 2 & n.2. Five of the six cases cited by the
Headley court as authority for an expansive reading of "sentences imposed in an illegal
manner" comefromjurisdictions where that expansive reading is tempered by rules that
permit sentences imposed in an illegal manner to be reviewed only within a limited period
after the sentence is imposed or affirmed. See United States . v Katzin, 824 F.2d. 234, 237
(3rd Cir. 1987) (120 days); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 239 F.3d 293,299
n.3 (3rd Cir. [V.I.] 2001) (120 days); State v. Sieler, 554 N.W.2d 477,479 (S.D. 1996) (120
days); State v. Anderson, 661 P.2d 716, 720 (Haw. App. 1983) (90 days); State v. Brooks,
589 A.2d 444, 446 (Me. 1991) (one year).
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1969), vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 935 (1972)). The State noted in its
opening brief that Kelbach had been vacated in part on other grounds.
In response, defendant argues that Kelbach has been overruled. Br. Respondent at
45. Defendant is mistaken. As in dozens of other cases decided the same day, the United
States Supreme Court vacated the Kelbach judgment, "insofar as it [left] undisturbed the
death penalty imposed." Kelbach v. Utah, 408 U.S. 935 (1972). The Supreme Court
cited to Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S. 845 (1972), which in turn cited to Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). While nine separate opinions were filed in Furman, the
majority apparently held "that the death penalty, as customarily prescribed and
implemented in this country [at the time of the decision], offendfed] the constitutional
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments," 408 U.S. at 414 (Powell, J.,
dissenting and summarizing the judgment of the majority). None of the opinions,
however, questioned the reasoning of the Utah Supreme Court on the point for which the
State has cited Kelbach.
Defendant further argues that the continuing validity of Kelbach is undermined by
"[t]he more recent decisions of Anderson, Johnson, Howell, Lipsky, and Young." Br.
Respondent at 45. Defendant cites to no language in these opinions undermining
Kelbach, and the State has discovered none.
Finally, defendant argues that the holding in Kelbach is inconsistent with the state
constitutional "due process protections at sentencing embraced in Johnson, Howell, and
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Lipsky." Br. Respondent at 46. Again, defendant cites to no language in these opinions
undermining Kelbach, and the State has discovered none.
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT ILC.2.
A REVIEWING COURT MUST PRESUME THAT A TRIAL COURT
CONSIDERED ALL RELEVANT RECORD EVIDENCE AT
SENTENCING
Defendant argues that the trial court's deviation from the PSI recommendation
demonstrates that the court failed to consider the information in the PSI. Br. Respondent
at 46-47. Defendant apparently concludes that the trial court had some duty to explain
why it imposed a sentence different from the sentence recommended and that failure to
explain the reasons for its sentence is evidence that the trial court did not consider that
information. Defendant points to no precedent suggesting that the trial court had a duty to
explain why its sentence differed from that recommended by the PSI investigator.
In its opening brief, the State detailed a number of factors the trial court may have
considered in imposing a sentence harsher than that recommended by the PSI. See Br.
Petitioner at 29-30. The trial court had before it record evidence that defendant was
wanted on an outstanding warrant when arrested, that he was carrying methamphetamine
and five knivca when arrested, that he had been untruthful about his drug abuse history,
and that he had an earlier retail theft conviction that "was sent to warrants six times."
R. 6-7, 52:2,4,9,10.
Absent evidence to the contrary, an appellate court must presume that the trial
court considered all relevant record evidence. See State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, % 11,439
15

Utah Adv. Rep. 26 ("we will not assume that the trial court's silence, by itself,
presupposes that the court did not consider the proper [sentencing] factors as required by
law"); State v. Beck, 584 P.2d 870, 872 (Utah 1978) (stating that it must be presumed that
the court used a court-ordered report as statute contemplated); State v. Schweitzer, 943
P.2d 649, 652 (Utah App. 1997) (affirming consecutive sentences where "defendant [did]
not show that the trial court failed to consider [statutory] factors").
The presumption that the trial court acted properly accords with case law requiring
an appellant to support an allegation of error with record evidence. "Absent that record,
defendant's assignment of error stands as a unilateral allegation which the review court
has no power to determine." State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289,293 (Utah 1982). A
reviewing court "simply cannot rule on a question which depends for its existence upon
alleged facts unsupported by the record." Id.
Defendant has pointed to no record evidence demonstrating that the trial court
failed to consider any relevant information. This Court must therefore presume that the
trial court considered the information relevant to sentencing. Further, as defendant has
pointed to no unreliable or irrelevant information upon which sentencing was based, this
Court must presume that the sentencing decision was based only on relevant and reliable
information.
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CONCLUSION
RESPECTFULLY submitted on Jg_ October 2002.
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Attorney General
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Addendum A

Rule 17. The trial.
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the nght to appear and defend in person and by counsel. The
defendant shall be personally present at the trial with the following exceptions:
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may consent in writing to trial in his
absence;
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from the trial
after notice to defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or
judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present; and
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause shown which may include
tumultuous,riotous,or obstreperous conduct.
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal attendance of the defendant at
the trial.

Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall set a time for
imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea,
unless the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to
present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should
not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any information
material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may likewise
be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's
arrest may be issued by the court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose sentence and shall enter
a judgment of conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following
imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal and the time
within which any appeal shall be filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment setting forth the
sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the
commitment to the jail or prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with
the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time.
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose sentence in accordance with
Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed
to the Department of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court
shall so specify in the sentencing order.
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Addendum B

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
—00O00—

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v
Thomas C Headley,
Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
Case No. 990462-CA
FILED
February 28, 2002
jl 2002 UT App 58 ||

Third District Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Tyrone Medley
Attorneys:
Edward R. Montgomery, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Thomas Brunker, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Jackson, Greenwood, and Thorne.
JACKSON, Presiding Judge:
Thomas Headley appeals the district court's denial of his Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence submitted under Rule
22(e) of the Utah Rules of Cnminal Procedure He contends the district court erred in ruling that his motion did
"not attack the legality of the sentence imposed nor the manner in which the sentence was imposed " Headley's
contention is two-fold: (1) his counsel at sentencing provided ineffective assistance; and (2) the sentencing court
relied on information in the presentence report that the court knew was false. We affirm.
A district court's Rule 22(e) decision is a legal question that we review for correctness, see State v Brooks, 908
P 2d 856, 858-59 (Utah 1995); State v. Patience. 944 P 2d 381, 384-85 (Utah Ct. App 1997), and we can affirm
the decision "if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record." State v Finlayson, 2000
UT 10J31, 994 P 2d 1243. Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for resentencing when a
sentence is illegal or "imposed in an illegal manner." Utah R Crim P 22(e). The definition of an "illegal sentence"
has been construed narrowly to include only sentences "where the sentence does not conform to the crime of
which the defendant has been convicted *<1) State v Parker. 872 P 2d 1041,1043 n 2 (Utah Ct App 1994) Utah
law has no comprehensive definitionof sentences "imposed in an illegal manner", however, the Utah Supreme
Court has ruled that a sentence is imposed in an illegal manner when a defendant is deprived of his or her Sixth
Amendment right to counsel during sentencing.[2) See Kuehnert v Turner, 28 Utah 2d 150, 499 P 2d 839, 841
(1975) (concluding that the sentence was illegal because the defendant did not have counsel at sentencing, was

http://courtlink.utcourts.ROv/opimons/mds/headlevhtm
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not informed of his Sixth Amendment rights during sentencing, and had not knowingly and intelligently waived his
Sixth Amendment rights)
In Kuehnert, the Utah Supreme Court stated that the presence of counsel at
sentencing is necessary
so that there is a real opportunity to present to the court facts in extenuation of the offense or in
explanation of the defendant's conduct, as well as to correct any errors or mistakes in reports of the
defendant's past record and to appeal to the equity of the court in its administration and enforcement
of penal laws
ld_ at 840-41

4)

Headley first claims his counsel at sentencing provided ineffective assistance, thus depriving him of his Sixth
Amendment nght To support his claim, Headley makes six assertions, four are as follows (1) he asserts that his
challenge to misinformation in the presentence investigation report was rejected by the sentencing court because
it was poorly handled by sentencing counsel, (2) he challenges several factual statements contained in the
presentence investigation report, (3) he asserts that "his own counsel accused him of being involved in incest
when that information was not otherwise before the court", and (4) he asserts that "his [sentencing] counsel
convinced a witness with potentially exculpatory evidence not to cooperate with [Headley]" Each of these four
assertions has some connection with the presentence investigation report, which is not in the record on appeal
Further, no other information in the record supports these assertions Accordingly, as discussed below, we are
unable to address them
Next, Headley claims the sentencing court imposed a $10,000 fine without reason and without objection by his
counsel We find no mention of a $10,000 fine in the record The only fines mentioned in the sentencing context, a
$1,000 recoupment fee and an unspecified amount to "pay for costs of extradition and for therapy of victim," are
found in the sentencing transcript and the Judgment filed three days later. Finally, Headley alleges that "his
counsel intentionally tned to prevent him from pursuing an appeal." However, the record reflects that Headley filed
a notice of appeal on September 24,1992, but voluntary moved to dismiss his appeal to "file a motion to
withdraw his plea of guilty" Headley's motion was granted on October 8,1992, and the record contains no
indication of subsequent attempts to appeal the case.
Without the presentence report or other information which may or may not be in the sentencing court record, the
record submitted to us is inadequate for our review of Headley's ineffective assistance claim All we have are
Headley's unilateral, bald assertions of misconduct. As we have stated,
When a defendant predicates error to [an appellate court], he has the duty and responsibility of
supporting such allegation by an adequate record Absent that record, a defendant's assignment of
error stands as a unilateral allegation which the reviewing court has no power to determine [An
appellate court] simply cannot rule on a question which depends for its existence upon alleged facts
unsupported by the record Consequently, in the face of an [inadequate record on appeal, [we]
must assume the regulanty of the proceedings below
State_y__Penman, 964 P 2d 1157,1162 (1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in original),
see also State v Lithertand. 2000 UT 76,f 17,12 P 3d 92 ("Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion,
ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel
performed effectively.") Accordingly, we reject Headley's Sixth Amendment claim.
Next, Headley claims the sentencing court was biased because it relied on information in the presentence report
that the court knew was false Utah Code Ann § 77-18-1 (6) (Supp 2001) gives a sentencing judge discretion in
evaluating information in a presentence report and requires the judge to "make a determination of relevance and
accuracy on the record " Here, the sentencing judge made a determination of the relevance and accuracy of the
presentence report, deciding the presentence report was "comprehensive in all the details," and stating that those
working on elements of the presentence report "do a pretty good job" The sentencing court has broad discretion
to resolve factual disputes for or against a defendant, see id . and we cannot say the court exceeded its discretion
in making this determination Further, without the presentence report, the record is inadequate and "'[we] must
assume the regularity of the proceedings below m Penman. 964 P 2d at 1162 (citation omitted) (alteration in
original)

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Headley's Rule 22(e) motion for resentencing.

Norman H. Jackson,
Presiding Judge

I CONCUR:

William A. Thome Jr., Judge

GREENWOOD, Judge (concurring in the result):
I concur in the result reached by my colleagues, but would affirm on what I perceive to be a more straightforward
basis. As stated by the majority, the trial court denied defendant's Rule 22(e) motion because the motion did "not
attack the legality of the sentence imposed nor the manner in which the sentence was imposed." The trial court
was correct.
Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and erroneous fact findings by the sentencing judge are
simply not cognizable under Rule 22(e). Defendant has not cited any caselaw holding otherwise and has also not
offered any reasoned analysis for why Rule 22(e) should apply to his case. See State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299,
305 (Utah 1998) (briefs must include "reasoned analysis based on [cited] authority"). The sentence imposed was
permissible under applicable statutes, and the trial court properly resolved factual disputes presented to it.
Defendant raises no claims legitimately related to whether the sentence was illegal or "imposed in an illegal
manner." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). On that basis, I would affirm.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
1. Nonconforming sentences include those where the sentence exceeds the statutory limits. See, e.g.. State v.
Hiqginbotham. 917 P.2d 545, 551 (Utah 1996) (concluding that the sentence was illegal because statute only
authorized one year enhancement and the court enhanced sentence by two years); State v. Patience. 944 P.2d
381, 388 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (noting that the sentence was illegal because it exceeded statutory term).
Nonconforming sentences also occur when the court is without jurisdiction to impose a sentence. See, e.g.. State
v. Hurst. 777 P.2d 1029,1036 n.6 (Utah 1989) (stating that sentences can be attacked when beyond the
jurisdiction of the sentencing court); State v. Arviso. 1999 UT App 381 ,H1f5-8, 993 P.2d 894 (stating that the
sentence was illegal because Supremacy Clause deprived sentencing court of jurisdiction); State v. Grate. 947
P.2d 1161,1168 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (stating that the sentence was illegal because court did not have
jurisdiction to revoke probation).
2. Other jurisdictions have defined sentences imposed in an illegal manner as those that are within statutory and
jurisdictional limits, but violate a defendant's rights, see, e.g.. Government of the V.I, v. Martinez. 239 F.3d 293,
299 n.3 (3rd Cir. 2001); State v. McNeills, 546 A.2d 292, 305-06 (Conn. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Sieler. 554
N.W.2d 447, 479 (S.D. 1996); cf State v. Anderson. 661 P.2d 716, 720-24 (Haw. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Brooks.
589 A.2d 444, 447 (Maine 1991); or that are based on erroneous information. See, e.g.. United States v. Katzin,
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824 F 2d 234 238 (3rd Cir 1987)
3 Kuehnert, which discusses illegal sentences under the rules in force prior to Rule 22(e), was not cited in the
parties' briefs
4 See also McConnell v Rh_ay, 393 U S 2, 4, 89 S Ct 32, 33-34 (1968) ("As we said in Mem&a[ vJRhay, 389
US 128 135, 88 S Ct 254, 257 (1967)],'the necessity for the aid of counsel in marshaling the facts, introducing
evidence of mitigating circumstancesf,] and in general aiding and assisting the defendant to present his case as to
sentence is apparent' The right to counsel at sentencing must, therefore, be treated like the right to counsel at
other stages of adjudication " (Citation omitted.)).
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
—00O00—

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.
Robert C. Burr,
Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
Case No. 20000336-CA
FILED
October 19, 2000

2000 UT App 288

Second District, Ogden Department
The Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan
Attorneys:
Robert C. Burr, Draper, Appellant Pro Se
L. Dean Saunders, Ogden, for Appellee

Before Judges Jackson, Billings, and Orme.
PER CURIAMAppellant Robert C. Burr appeals the denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 22 of the Utah
Rules of Cnminal Procedure. This case is before the court on the State's motion for summary affirmance.
The sentence imposed was within statutory limits; however, Burr contends the sentence was imposed in an illegal
manner because he was not personally provided with a copy of the presentence report. The sentencing transcript
reflects that the tnal court confirmed that defense counsel had the opportunity to review the presentence report
The trial judge also asked Burr whether he understood the sentencing recommendation made in the report, and
Burr responded in the affirmative.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404(bXO (1999) states that "the court, prosecutor, and the defendant or his attorney shall
be provided with" the written presentence report. (Emphasis added ) Similarly, Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (6)(a)
(1999) states, in part, that "[t]he department shall provide the presentence report to the defendant's attorney, or
the defendant if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and the court for review three working days prior to
sentencing." (Emphasis added); see also Neelv Holden. 886 P 2d 1097,1102 n 4 (Utah 1996) (stating section
77-18-1 (6)(a) requires that "the defendant or the defendant's attorney be provided, prior to sentencing, with a
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written presentence report") Burr cites no authority for his claim that the court must affirmatively determine
whether a defendant who is represented by counsel has personally received or actually reviewed the report Burr
failed to establish that his sentence was either illegal or imposed in an illegal manner, and the trial court did not
err in denying the motion.
The State also argues that Burr failed to timely move to withdraw his guilty plea under Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6
(1999). Burr did not file any motion to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court, and the issue is not properly before
this court on appeal. The request to withdraw the guilty plea was based solely upon the Rule 22(e) motion. See
State v. Arviso, 1999 UT App 381 f ffl[9-1 1 . 993 p - 2 d 8 9 4 (holding guilty plea may be withdrawn in the limited
circumstance where plea bargain contemplated a particular sentence subsequently determined to be illegal).
Having determined that the sentence was not illegal or imposed in an illegal manner, there is no basis from which
to conclude that Burr should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.
Affirmed.

Norman H. Jackson,
Associate Presiding Judge

Judith M. Billings, Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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